MILITARY DEPOT

Military Remarks

Relative to the Island

of

Guadeloupe

by

Archd. Campbell Capt. Lieut.

Engineer.

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Introduction.

As it has been at all times a settled Maxim in Military Discipline; that it is the indispensible duty of every Officer, to be assiduous in making his Observations; and no less carefull in communicating them for the good of the Service; an Engineer is particularly bound from the nature of his employ, as well as by all the Ties of Allegiance, honour, and that Respect, which is due to His King and Country; to discharge his trust in this instance, with Zeal, and diligence. It is therefore matter of Surprize, that after two unsuccessfull attempts upon the Island of Guadeloupe; there should not have been, any Plans of that Country; even Sketches, or any Military Remark handed down to Posterity, from Officers employ'd on either of those Services; which might favour its Reduction, on any future occasion.

But however this came to pass, such was certainly the fact; and the British troops were actually landed here in 1759.; almost as totally ignorant of the Country in which they were to Act; as the very Adventurers who first discovered the Island; by which unhappy

circumstance,

many Retrograde Steps were unavoidably pursued, at the expence of much time and Treasure; and which was of far greater consequence; the Lives of many Valuable Subjects lost in bringing the Inhabitants to a Capitulation; This indeed was at length accomplished, by the superior Spirit, and discipline of our Troops; tho' with proper intelligence it might have been effected, with half the loss sustained; Since which happy Period, every gentle measure, seem'd to have been sensibly practised by our Governors; to perpetuate the best impressions of Britain. But tho' Guadeloupe, and its dependencies, have sufficiently experienced, the Mild Effects of British Government; and Trade with all its consequential emoluments, extended itself to a far greater degree, than the French Planters of those Islands had ever been accustomed to; yet there is reason to fear, it would be found a vain hope; that the Remembrance of this alone, will dispose them to an immediate Submission; tho' at the same time, we may with probability assure ourselves, that it might prevent their pushing matters to the last Extremity.

This notion will the more clearly appear to be well founded, if we consider,

* Flibustiers, are the Refuge of Nations, who resort to those Islands, and are generally employ'd in War time, on board of Privateers, or in defence of the Islands in case of an Enemy's Approach.

that there are three Classes of People in this Island; The Ecclesiasticks, the Military, and the Mercantile; and that the two former with whom the *Flibustiers generalley join themselves, are sufficient to overawe the Rest; and fully determined to make all possible resistance in a Country, where Art and Nature both, but more especially the latter, has done so much to render it defensible, against Forces every way Superior to them in alacrity and discipline.

From those considerations, join'd with the sincerest desire of Obviating the forementioned Misfortunes, the following Military Remarks were carefully digested; and should the Victorious Arms of Britain be again bend on this Isle; I flatter myself that they, together with the Plans and Sketches of the Principal Strong Posts in Guadeloupe, will be found of Publick Utility, in shortening Operations on any future attempt; at least, my having had this Idea, rendered it my duty, to regulate my whole Remarks into the form of a Siege, excluding at the same time every Superfluous attack, or Manoeuvre, but what appeared to me upon the Spot, absolutely Necessary for the Conquest of Guadeloupe.

Necessary information previous to the Expedition

The method of carrying on service in this Country being so very different to that practised in Europe; it may not be improper to suggest the following hints. Viz.t

Qualifications of the Attacking troops } That, the troops destined for such an enterprize, should be good Marksmen, Light Clothed, and previously accustomed to the Manoeuvres of dispersing, and forming quickly; because, the Militia who compose among the French, the greatest Number under Arms; Fight in a scattered disorderly manner, each making the best use of his Firelock against the common foe.

Field Artillery their use in the Attack. } That, exclusive of such Battering Cannon as may be thought requisite for the Sieges of Fort Royal, and Fort George; the Army should be supplyd with a great proportion of Howitzes, Royals,

and Six pounders, as Field Artillery of this Nature, can be more advantagiously applyd to the services of this Country, than perhaps in any Quarter of the Globe; for the unevenes of the Ground, & the Natural quick Vegitation of those Islands, particularly along the face of Gulleys; supplys an Enemy with such shelter, as can not be seen into, or Scowred, without Cannon and Mortars; besides, the Militia in general, were found to be more apprehensive of the effect of Artillery, than Reason, Example, or Experience could Cure.

Militia of Guadeloupe their composition, and Character in the field

The Militia of this Island, is formd into three distinct Corps; The Flibustiers, Free Mulattoes and Negroes, and the Plantation Slaves. From the Flibustiers, little conduit or Stratagem was experienced on their attacks; and but a small proportion of Agility, or Resolution; nor can it be otherwise expected from such a Banditty, unless the hope of Plunder is apparently great. But the Free Mulattoes,

and Negroes, fought from a different principle their Liberty; which by the Artifice of Priests was judiciously ballanced against the Horrors of abject Slavery; This Corps must therefore be particularly attended to, as Success even in the most trivial onset, was found to raise their alacrity to an extravagant pitch of Insolence. As to the Plantation Slaves, they were never known to succeed in their briskest enterprize; and tho' they generally attempted the Air of a good Countenance on the commencement of an Attack, yet the best disguise could not conceal their wretched pusillanimity.

Capital posts in the Island.

As the principal objects, will naturally be first attended to, by the General commanding the attack of Guadeloupe; & his utmost Efforts push'd, while the troops are in health, and Vigour; it is necessary he should know, that the principal Strong Posts he has to encounter are four; Fort Royal and Fort George, Fortresses on the Coast; The Grande Reduit,

and the Dosdane, posts of Consequence in the Mountains. Fort Royal and Fort George will of course claime his earliest notice; for which purpose I would propose the following

General disposition for the Attack

That the Army be formd into two Bodies for investing those Fortresses on the same day; the greater division to proceed against Fort Royal; and the lesser which need not exceed one third of the other in number, to act against Fort George.

As the situation of those Forts, are on opposite sides of the Island; and the interior posts of Consequence lying between; I'm of opinion, that the double attention of two Bodies of troops, moving towards the Enemy in different directions at the same time, will be attended with very material advantages; by disuniting their force; & increasing their fatigue, the common grounds for much

* N. B. Exclusive of the necessary covering fleet to Windward, to prevent the Supply of troops and amunition from Martinique; it will be necessary before the Forts are invested, to Station a Small Squadron of Armd Sloops or Briggs on the N. W. Side of Guadeloupe near the Isle St. Christophe to intercept such Vessels as may come from St. Eustatia with Provisions a manoeuvre which the French will undoubtedly Practise; and by means of the small Arm of Sea which seperates the Islands, supply this part of the Country as they did last War with all the necessaries of Life.

clamour and discontent among Creoleans of a Slothfull Choleric disposition; and consequently in expediting the Service; a Circumstance, which ought to be particularly attended to before the Sickly Season advances; as Ten Soldiers have been sacrifised to its bad effects, for one who received his death by Gunshot wounds. *

Of Fort Royal.

Necessary information previous to the Siege of Fort Royal

Situation of the Fort. } This Fortress is situated on Basse Terre side of Guadeloupe, close upon the high Northern Banks of the River Gallion; fourty seven yards above the level of the Sea in a perpendicular direction, and One hundred and thirty yards Horizontally. On the North W. side, the town of Basseterre stretches itself from the Glacis of the Fort, as far as Crumps Battery, being 1800 yards in a direct line; and on the N. East, the Country rises with a gradual ascent to the Mountains, as does most of Basse terre quarter from the line of its Coast;

To the South East the Heights of Bisdary, extend from the Scarp of the Gallion as far as the foot of Morne Howelmont which is distant 1200. yards; And on the South.d it is bounded by the Sea.

Construction and defect of its works. } With respect to the Works, they appear to be the patch pieces of several generations; The most regular Front and the latest built, is that towards the N. East consisting of two Bastions, and a Curtain of Excellent Ma:sonry; which presents to the Field Seventeen pieces of heavy Cannon with a dry ditch of 50 feet broad, and 15 in depth; over which a hollow wooden trunk, conveys a stream of good water, sufficient to supply the Fort Cisterns for all the services of the Garrison; but the whole of this front is commanded at the distance of 350 yards. From this front the Fort stretches itself three hundred yards to the South.d along the Banks of the Gallion, gradually narrow:ing itself as it approaches the Sea; and tho this Front is but weakly Flank'd; and the Parapet of low Slight Masonry;

yet from the natural steepness of this rugged Bank, and a small Escarpement of 12 feet from the foot of the Wall, at the most accessible parts; it is secured beyond the danger of an Assault. From the Scarp of the Gallion, a bad low Revetement, incloses the Fort towards the Sea, and has a dry ditch in front; from which the British troops in 1759. conveyd a Line of Communication to the water's edge; for transporting Amunition and Stores from the Beach. The front towards the Town, is no more than a long line of Bad Masonry, with a Redan, and dry ditch; but by its Retired position behind the West Bastion, it procures a warm protection from the Artillery of this prolongd Flanks, which is crossd by the fire of a Ravelin situated before the Draw Bridge of the Fort. This Ravelin has a Draw Bridge also, and a good dry ditch scoured by four pieces of Cannon; two from the Redan, and two from the Gateway of the Fort.;

In 1759. the British increased the fire of this front, by a new Covert way; and inclosed a considerable Area in

its front to Encamp part of the Regiment left in Garrison; as there was not sufficient Room within the Body of the Fort, for more than 400. men, from the Narrowness of its form. The West face of the West Bastion is not Razed by any fire, and has but a shallow unfinished ditch in front; this face is only 27 feet high from the Beam, and may be seen from the adjacent heights on the N. East as low as the Plinth.

Souterrains Bomb proof } The Souterrains of this Fort are only three; two powder Magazines, and a Laboratory store; the Principal powder Magazine is situated under the West Flank of the North East Bastion and the lesser under the Donjon (N.) The Laboratory lies under the North East Flank of the West Bastion, and has a communication to the ditch by means of a Sally Port which also serves to give a circulation of Air to the lower floor of the Laboratory. — there is a third Magazine for Powder near the Midle of the Fort; but it is not Bomb Proof, nor even well secured from the effect of Cannon.

* ..... Gentlemen of the Navy may differ from me in this point; it being a maxim of theirs, that no Coast-Battery can withstand the impetuosity of a ship's Broadside; but that is more particularly owing to their never having attack'd Coast works on proper principles of Construction, than to the justness or propriety of such Reasoning; as I can make it appear that even four twelve Pounders disposed agreable to a New System of my invention for Coast defence, are capable of Beating alone of Battle ship.

Remark.] The Town Plain of this Fort falls from the N. East front with a considerable declivity towards the Sea; and so ill are the works adapted to this Sloping ground, that the whole Body of the Fort, may be Raked its full extent from shipping; owing to which happy circumstance, and the small proportion of Cannon fronting the Sea, that the British Squadron in 1759 met with little opposition, in comparison to what might have been naturally expected from the great advantages of this Elevated situation; But as the French will from the fatal experience they have had of those inconveniences attending the construction, not only improve the works in general before another war; and the defences towards the Sea in particular; which is capable of being executed in such a manner, as to render them *impregnable to ships; I would propose the following disembarkation & subsequent measures, as the most practicable, easy expedients in Reducing Port Royal by Siege.

Disembarkation for the Siege of Fort Royal.

As the latest authentick intelligence I could learn from this Island, seems to settle the state and disposition of the Enemy's posts and works; as the British left them in 1763, the attack of course, can only be calculated for that period; on this supposition therefore, I would choose that the disembarkation was effected at the West end of Basse Terre town (mark'd a. in Plan 1.) because the Entrenchments here, and 200 yards to the West.d may be scoured in many places by the Cannon of the Men of War; and are almost totally commanded from their Round-tops; and tho.' the French may remedy those inconveniences, by Strong Traverses, and heightening the Parapet; yet from the great depth of water along this Coast, Bomb Ketches can come suffi ciently nigh, to throw Round shot from their Mortars, which I look upon as the best dislodging fire we have at present in use; besides, the ground in Rear of those Entrenchments, ascends so gradually for near 800. yards, that no Body of troops can form upon the

heights to oppose a disembarkation; without being much exposed to the Cannonade of our covering ships; so that the disembarkation at this place, may be well protected and supported; nor do I know that it is exposed to any inconvenience, except what may be supposed to arise from the Cannon of Fort Royal; which might annoy it, at the distance of 2000. yards; but as the attention of the Fort may be otherwise engaged, by the flying Broadsides of three, or four line of Battle ships; or the disembarkation itself, be performd at Break of day; as indeed all disembarkations ought, and not in the Evening, as was too generally practised last War; that objection will vanish of Course. A natural question may also arise, from Military gentlemen unacquainted with the face of this Country, and the disposition of the Enemy's works; "Why, I would not disembark "the Troops further to the West.d, and even avoid the chance Anoyance, "to which our present proximity to the Fort is Exposed"; But when I inform them, that there is no other proper place for a disembarkation nearer than Balif Bay, which is distant 3 miles from Fort Royal;

that the ground above the present disembarkation, is absolutely the best situation for the Encampment of our Army; and that the Troops in their March from the Balif to possess it; will not only have the passage of the River De Pères to force; but also, the heights of Morne Rouge; on which there are two lines of Entrenchments, a Stone Redoubt, and two Batteries of Cannon; I should imagine that those circumstances will sufficiently obviate that query.

The troupes will therefore occupy the heights of Morne Rouge, immediatly on their disembarkation; where they will fall in with the Rear of those Entrenchments, Redoubt, & Batteries; above which, they will find good encamping ground for the Army, even sheltered from the Cannon of the Fort.

Line of Posts for Covering the Siege.

The Line of Posts which an Army should occupy to cover the Siege of Fort Royal, are as follows, Viz.t Morne la Place, Mons.r Devoree's Plantation, and the heights above Madam Rulé.

The necessity of its extension tho' dangerous

Tho this extension of the Line is more than is wished for on Service, yet such is the command of those heights over the Sloping Country, between them and Fort Royal; that the Besiegers will be eternally harrassd if an Enemy is allowed to Possess them; and tho' the unevenes of ground round those heights, favour the near approach of an Enemy, unperceived to any of the posts attacked; yet it is certain, that an Enemy may be discovered from some one of the Neighbouring posts; long before the Post on which the attack is directed; is itself aware of the danger.

Inconvenience of uneven Ground remedyd by signals.

I would therefore propose to introduce the use of Signals by day at those Posts, as the Navy perform at Sea; a manoeuvre, which tho' it has not yet been practised in our Army; may be found of Real utilitys by freeing our Advanced Posts from the dangers of surprize, to which they were occasionally exposed last War; one Instance among many others I beg leave to state as follows.

Instance of the propriety of Signals

On the 27th. of January 1762. General Haviland's Brigade at Martinique, was Posted on a high Ridge opposite to the center of the French Army; who then lay on Morne Garniere; with the River of Fort Royal in his front; a Precipice on his Right; and an easy fall of Ground upon his left; covered by the Light Infantry Corps, and Rangers; a Battalion of the 42d. Regiment, was Encamped on the side of a Strong Ridge upon his Right; on the summit of which, I was then employ'd, in Erecting a Mortar Battery against the Redoubt of Morne Garnier; and tho this Post was not above 800 yards distant in a direct Line from Haviland's Brigade; yet the only practicable Road for a foot Passenger exceeded a mile and a half; Opposite to Genl. Haviland's Post, a large wood conceal'd from him the whole of the Enemy's Manoeuvres, on the other side of the water; tho' from our Mortar Battery, they were distinctly perceived; and in consequence thereof, a Soldier was dispatch'd to General Haviland, to inform him of the Enemy's motions; but before he had time to reach the Post,

it was attacked., —— As our men were at this time mostly at dinner, the advanced Centinels were actually engaged before the Main Body was aprized of the Enemy's approach; and tho' no troops could be sooner form'd for Action; yet the unexpectedness of the Event, might have been productive of the Worst consequences; a sharp Action ensued, and happily for us, the Enemy not only threw away their Fire early, but by some sudden redicuslous panick, precipitated their Retreat, our troops followed, and so mixed themselves with the Enemy, that they entered their very works along with them. —

Had the use of Signals, been at this time established in the Army, that Brigade would not have been exposed to the danger which at that time threatened. But to return,

A Detachment should instantly occupy the height of Morne la Place, with a strong Redoubt to cover the operations of the Siege on that side; and the Light Infantry, and Rangers, should lose no time in gaining the heights of Deuree's, and

Madam Rule's Plantations, which can be performd most readily, by marching along the town of Basse terre, and over the Bridge of the River des Herbes, (markd b.) at the East end of which, they will find a Road by the Back of the Walls (c. d. e.) leading to Godette Demanes lower Plantation; the whole of which Rout, is well sheltered from the Fort, by the Buildings of the Town, and the rising Grounds which happily intervene; at this plantation, they will have it in their power to divide themselves, for the attack of those different Posts by the Roads (f g. and h k.) and the troops at Morne la Plane may greatly facilitate this service, by moving part of their force along the Road (l m.) as if they intended penetrating upon the Flank of the Augustines Plantation; where it is likely that a Body of the Enemy may Lodge themselves; During this interval that division of our Army destined for the operations of the Siege should march by the former Rout as far as Madam — (at d.) and occupy the summit of the Jesuits Hill (n o p.) from whence Fort Royal is commanded at the distance of 350. and 400 yards.

Siege.] As this Fort is extremely confined; and the materials of its Construction, entirely Stone and Lime; the Terre Plain a Soft Rab; and has no Casemates but what are barely sufficient to contain the Amunition, and Stores of the Garrison; I should imagine, that a good Battery of Mortars would in a very few days, reduce Fort Royal to a Capitulation; But allowing that the Fort was Casemated; and in every other respect equipt for a Siege; if the N. East front remains in the state which the British left it in 1763, however increased, & amended, the defences may be towards the Sea; I'm of opinion, from the near Command which those heights have over this front; and the facility of a good communication to the Beach; by which, all kinds of Artillery, amunition, and stores, may be transported, unexposed to the Cannon of the Fort; that it will Cost an Active Army, the operations of very few days, to prepare a Breach in the North face of the West Bastion, fit for our troops to Mount; if a sufficient quantity of Fascines, and Gabions, are prepared; a circumstance which ought to be particularly attended to by the Chief Engineer

of the Expedition, before the Army is disembarked; as there is but little Wood in the Environs of Fort Royal proper for such materials.

The Grande Camp is the next post of consequence to which our army on this side of the Island ought to bend their attention, after the Reduction of Fort Royal; because this acquisition will not only strip the Dessaline of one of its principal protections; but also give our Army excellent command of Ground, for favouring its attack; it is necessary therefore to know the following.

Information previous to the Attack of the Grande Camp

Its Situation } The Grande Camp is situated, at the foot of the Mountains, two English miles North-East of Fort Royal; On the West.d it embraces the high Banks of the Gallion, and to the East.d it inclines with a gentle declivity towards the River Lence; which at this place runs nearly Parallel with the Gallion at the distance of 500 yards.

Nature of its works} In 1759 the French occupyd the sum:
:mit of this ground with a slight En:
trenchment (K.) towards the South East; terminating its right
Flank on the Scarp of the Gallion; its left towards the River
de Sence. A little retired from the front of this Line, a Barbet
Battery (H.) occupies the top of a small Eminence with two
Guns, which overlooks the low grounds between it and Fort
Royal, and that can bear upon the Flank of any attack
against the front of the Dosdéne. At (I.) another Battery
of three Field Pieces, and six Swivels, commands the Pass
over the Gallion; being the only practicable one between the
Fort and this Post except that which crosses at Madam Rabé's.

Attack.

The most short, easy, and effectual method of
dislodging the Enemy from this Post, is by advancing a few
Royals, Howitzes, and Field Pieces, to the heights (O.)
above Madam Rules Plantation; from whence the Grande

Camp is not only commanded, but the greatest part of the Enemy's trenchment taken en Reverse; If the Artillery therefore briskly execute their duty; an Enemy can not remain long in posession of this Post; but before it is certain, that the Enemy have quitted their works; and that the face of the Gallion is perfectly cleared; the Passage ought not to be attempted on any Account; as we had last war, the unhappy experience of few men in such a situation, capable of destroying ten times their number.

The troops will therefore cross the Gallion under a warm cover of Cannon, & Mortars; and establish themselves on the heights of the Grande Camp; from whence, all the Batteries in front of the Dosdaine, may be Flank'd, and the Entrench^t. Infiladed its full extent. I would choose that a part of the Army was disembarked at Grande Anse Bay; the day on which the Grande Camp was to be attack'd, with orders to advance, & Post themselves at (K. Plan 2^d.) above the Easternmost Gulley, in Rear of the Dosdaine; not only to divert the Enemy's attention

from the Front of the Dosdáne, and favour the real attack; but also to cut off the Retreat of such Inhabitants as may be Stationd there, and their communication with the Grande Redoubt and Trois Rivieres Countries. The manner of effecting this disembarkation shall be here after specifyd, & in the mean time I'le proceed to the

Dosdáne

Necessary Information previous to the Attack of the Dosdáne.

Strength of Situation, and nature of its works. } This Post is undoubtedly as strongly Fortifyd by Nature as any Post in the Island of Guadeloupe; Its front is about 400 yards to the South.d of the Grande Camp, and has the remains of three Barbet Batteries (marked L. Plan 1.) which formerly contain ten small Guns; and the Line of Entrenchment (M.). The whole of its front does not exceed 800 yards in length, and is so steep that a very small Escarpment might render it impracticable for troops to mount. The Road from Basse Terre leading thro the Trois Rivieres, and Gabsterre Countries, penetrates

on its South Flank, and is rendered very secure by the Traverses at (N.) as well as by the Flanking fire of the three Batteries on the heights of Bisdary (marked G.); Its Right Flank is covered by the Grande Camp, and a chain of woody Mountains which seperate the Cabsterre from the Basse Terre Country; and its left by a Ridge of Rugged Hills, that extend to the South: ernmost point of the Island; On its Rear are two Gulleys of immense depth; over which, the Road to Grande Ance, the Trois Riviere, Cabsterre &c passes in several windings

Utility of this Post to the Inhabitants.

In 1759 the Inhabitants of the Quarter of Basse Terre retired hither with their wives Children and effects, and raised temporary Buildings for their Lodgement; where they remained in perfect Security during the attack of the Island; our Army not choosing to attack it, either from our ignorance of its Strength; the weakness of our Numbers; or the probability of acquiring it without the loss of more Lives, than the

advantage of such an Acquisition was thought to deserve; but such a Step, would in my opinion increase their fears to a most melancholly height; particularly, as our successes in many Skirmishes after the disembarkation had generated a despondency, which would naturally have suggested many reasons for declining a General Action with Regular Troops flush'd with succes, and skill'd in war; and consequently, be the happy means, of bringing the whole inhabitants of this Quarter to a capitulation.

Of the Attack.} The troops Posted in Rear of the Dosdane are to begin a sharp Cannonade the morning of the attack; and even endeavour to Penetrate on its Rear; after which, the Artillery stationed at the Grande Camp, will open against the front of the Dosdane; and endeavour to dislodge any lurking Enemy, from the wood on its Right Flank; thro which, there are two foot Paths leading from the Grande Camp, to the front of the Dosdane; the one (marked, r.) along the side of a water Course,

being the Right hand Path; the other (marked, S.) ascending thro the Wood on the left. The Post of Madam Manville's house; ought to be siezed upon immediatly; as a proper station for executing new measures, should the Enemy attempt disputing the Road to Garbo's house; which is a Confined and dangerous Pass; But from their confidence of a Perfect security, in Front, and Rear; they did not seem inclinable to Fortify the interior parts in 1759; and should this be the Case, on a future emergency; our Troops ought to avail themselves of the Enemy's consternation, at our having penetrated their Front; and occupy Post at Garbo's immediatly; as there is not any other situation of Consequence, within the circuit of the Dosdane that is not commanded from thence.

Of the Grande Anse

Its consequence to an Attacking Army. } As this Bay is not only the most Practicable for a Debarkation, of any other twixt Port Royal, and the Grande Reduit, and contains

the best Anchoring ground for ships; The nature of the heights above it, favourable for the Establishment of a Strong Post; the situation of advantageous consequence to an Attacking Army; by affording them an accessible Rout; either to the attack of the Dosdaine in Rear, or the Grande Reduit in front; giving them at the same time an opportunity of Cutting off the Enemy's communication between those Principal Posts; I should imagine it an Object deserving the Generals immediate attention, after the Reduction of Fort Royal.

Its Situation.} This Post is situated on the East side of Guadeloupe; distant about two miles from the Rear of the Dosdane; and three miles from the Front of the Grande Reduit. The Bay is a mile in extent, but from its position, much exposed to the Windward Surf except at (A. Plan 2.d:) the usual Anchoring ground for Vessels in three and four fathom water where it Receives tolterable shelter from the Projection of a low point of land to the North.d thro: which the River of Grande Once empties itself into the Sea.

Works, and their disposition.

On the North East side of Grande Anse River; stands a good Stone & Lime Battery of 5. 24 Pounders; in the rear of which, and all round this Point, the French in 1759 raised the Entrenchments (C.) against a disembarkation; and more Retired on the Plantation of Mr. Mare, a Circular Battery of three Field pieces (D) with an Entrenchment, which had a good & clear command over the low Grounds twixt them and the Coast; this Post was intended to have been strengthend by a work on the Eminence (I.) where the traces of an Entrencht. is still Visible. Along the Bay to the Southd. an Entrenchment lines the whole of the Coast; from the foot of which, the Bank is so Sharpe, as to render it inaccessible; except at Madam Foy's Plantation, and between the houses of Mr. Kettelle & Fidlin; on the Flanks of which Entrenchment are two Batteries (E. and F.) the former consisting of one piece of Cannon the latter of two; towards the North End of the Bay, there is a third Battery of Cannon (G.) which Scours the Beach on either side; whose Guns are judiciously conceald, from the view

of shipping, by a strong Epaulment towards the Sea; and on the height (H.) they had one Gun En Barbet.

Disembarkation at Grande Ance.

I would choose that the disembarkation took place at (L.) where the water is generally Calm, and little Surf to hurt or disorder the landing of Boats; Before which, Grande Ance Battery must be silenced which need be no difficult matter from any ship stationed at (A.) where the Battery is entirely exposed in Flank; and the Enemy dislodged by the Bombketches from the height (H.) and Battery (G.) where it is likely they will Lodge themselves secure from the Cannonade; or endeavour to establish themselves so, as to render the attack of Morés Post difficult, and dangerous, without this precaution; our troops on the disembarkation should therefore lose no time in Occupying the height (H.) as they will thereby have it in their power to maintain a safe Communication with the Fleet; and under its cover, bring up the necessary Artillery for dislodging the Enemy from (I.)

a Post which is only 450 yards distant; and over which, it has a full Command; so soon as the Enemy are drove from thence, our Army will under cover of the same Artillery cross the River at Break of day in front of this Post; and by Sliding along the South side of that Eminence, they will avoid the whole of the Enemy's works on Mare's Plantation; and get upon the commanding ground in its Rear, without crossing any Ravin, Battery, or Entrenchment. The Troops destined for a feint upon the Rear of the Dordane will therefore march to their Ground at (K.) along the great Road to Basse Terre; and the Advance towards the Grande Reduit should occupy the most favourable Spots with Strong inclosed Redoubts, to oppose any Efforts which the Enemy will naturally attempt on that side. It may be proper here to Remark my opinion, that all advanced Posts for maintaining of Ground, should be shut up in such works; and tho' this System, differs essentially from the Practice of French Engineers, in that Country last War; Reason may be found its best Advocate; nor are there sufficient examples from experience wanting to establish its propriety.

Of Fort George

Necessary information previous to the Siege.

Its situation.} Fort George is situated on Grande Terre side of Guadeloupe, about 30 yards above the level of the Sea; and 400 yards distant, from the Channel entrance, of a large Commodious Harbour, which takes its name from the Fort.

To the North.d an Eminence closely unites itself, with that on which the Fort is placed, nearly of the same extent; and at the distance of four, and Six hundred yards more Northerly; two other heights in form of Sugar Loaves; rise suddenly from a Plain, which extends itself along the Beach East from Fort George 900 y.ds at the extremity of this plain, a Strong Ridge Lines the Coast for 600 yards farther to the East; and finishes with a considerable declivity towards the West end of the Grande Bay; A deep Ravin encompasses one side of this Ridge; thro which, a wide, easy, good Road, passes to Gozier and the Town of St. Anns.

and on the other side, the ground falls suddenly to the Rough Cliffs of its Coast. To the North West of Fort George, a considerable Marsh over grown with Mangroves surrounds one side of the Fort Hill, & the two adjacent Eminences; terminating in a Pond near to the Sea; to which it has a Communication, with a small Bridge across for the Road leading to Abymes; and which directs itself from hence along the summit of a considerable Ridge, situated the west side of this Salt water Marsh.

Construction and defect of its works.

The materials of this Fort are new, and the construction Regular; being an oblong Square whose ends are equally Fortify'd a Cremaillière; its entrance fronts the south; and is protected by a Spur, to which it has a Communication, by the means of a Draw Bridge; from this Spur, a flight of Stairs descends to the Area of an intended ditch, in which the British form'd a circular Battery in Barbet for Ten 24 Pounders, to protect the Entrance of Fort George Harbour; The Fort itself seems only calculated for 150 men; and has a good Cistern

for water, and a Powder Magazine. The Parapet is only three feet thick; and built of such bad materials, that the very freeing of the Guns brought down the Merlons. In 1759. a Line of Entrenchment

an 3d; (marked, C.) extends from the Salt water Pond along the Coast round to the Easternmost hill, & is strengthened by 24 pieces of Cannon distributed in Six Batteries as (b.) and the British troops on the Reduction of Fort George inclosed the two advanced hills (e.) with Redoubts; and stretched a line of Communication (f.) between them, to Secure a detachment of 800 men left for the defence of this Post, while the other part of our Army were penetrating the Country of Guadeloupe.

As the Retired position of those hills from the water's edge; their great height, and command over any assailing Squadron; may with the addition of Proper works; render this Post extremely difficult to Reduce by Shipping in a future attempt; the following measures appeared to me the best for accomplishing it by Siege.

Disembarkation for the siege of Fort George.

The Army to disembark at Gozier where there are but two Guns, and

a slight Entrenchment to encounter, and a sufficient depth of water for the necessary covering ships; from this Post, they will find a good, broad Road leading to Fort George, about three miles in length; along which, the light Troops of this division of our Army, should immediately proceed, to Establish themselves upon the Strong Ridge, the west end of Grande Bay; alloting at the same time, a Chain of Posts, on the heights above the Bend of said Bay; to cover the advancement of Such Artillery as may be wanted for the Siege.

Grande Bay would undoubtedly, have been more comodious for the debarkation of men, and stores, for the operations of this Siege; were there water enough, to carry the Flatt Bottom'd Boats in; but I have seen Canoes, aground in several parts of it; and tho' I never tryd the depth of water, myself; I'm well assured from those that did, that it is impossible to effect a landing on account of the shoals.

Tho' the Ridge (n.) on which I propose breaking ground, is a little lower than the Easternmost Hill, within the Lines of Fort George; yet, the space of ground which its summit occupys, is of

six times its Capacity; which will not only give our Army an opportunity of Proportioning their works to those of the Enemy; but the power also, of maintaining a superiority of fire, to any single object in reach; nor do I know that this situation labours under any other inconvenience, except the want of water, which is a general complaint over almost the Whole Country of Grande Terre; however the River of Grande Bay, which is the only one in the whole of this district, is able to supply our Army with all they may want; and only half a mile from the end of this Bridge.

Siege.} The Easternmost Redoubt will be first attack'd; and from its confined space, must soon give way to the joint Effect of Cannon, and Mortars; and as this work is higher than the West Redoubt, or even the hill on which the Fort Stands; and the defences of Fort George so trifling in themselves; I'm of opinion, that on our Establishing a Lodgement there, the Enemy will be glad to accept of any honourable terms proposed.

After the necessary Garrison is fixed at Fort George, the Remaining part of this Army, should re-embark for a descent on Gabstouse,

which I intend as a feint upon the rear of the Grande Reduit; to increase the Enemy's apprehension on that side; and draw off part of their force from the front.

Disembarkation in Cals-Fere.

It is necessary for this service, that the Army be provided with arm'd Sloops, to cover the disembarkation; as there is a Reef of Rocks, at the distance of 800 yards; which lines this Coast from the Grande Point, as far as St. Maries, to the North.d; over which there is only Soundings of 3 and 3½ fathoms.

The Bays of Angoin and Bonaniere, are very commodious for this service; and tho. they are small, each of them have a good soft Sandy Beach; are tollerably well secured from the windward Surf; and have no Battery or work to impede a disembarkation.

The troops on the landing, will move to the West.d; towards the Ravin Sallee; where they will find a small Ridge well adapted for a Post; and commodious for future measures; where I shall suppose them posted before the attack of the Grande Reduit.

Of the Grande Reduit

Necessary information previous to the Attack. Viz^t.

Its situation, and Strength. } The Grande Reduit occupy's a tract of high Table Land, situated between the Trois Rivieres, and the Rich Country of Cabsterre. On one side, it is protected by a Chain of Woody Mountains; on the other, by the high Cliffs of a Rugged Coast. Its front terminates one extremity of this Table land, with a Considerable declivity towards Trois Rivieres; and its Rear, the other, with a like fall of ground towards Cabsterre. A Slight, irregular, Ruinous Line of Entrenchment, occupy's the whole of its front, which is near two miles in Extent; and flank'd by six Batteries, containing 18 pieces of Cannon distributed as per Sketch (N°. 4 marked, A.B. C.D.E.F.) Those Batteries, from their Elevated situation, and the regular Steep Slope of the Bank they cover; procure excellent command, over troops that attack on this side; and give great strength to the Entrench: ment, tho' Slight, and ill constructed. There are four Practicable Roads leading to the Grande Reduit on this side; The first close

to the Mountains; opposite to Vernon's Plantation; (marked a.b.c.) the second by Mr. Corbets Battery; (d.e.f.) The third by the Great Road from Trois Riviere; (g h) and the fourth opposite to Madam Grants Plantation; (k l.) The two former, are steep and narrow; the latter two, wide, and easy of Ascent.

On its Rear, a Battery of four Guns in Barbet, and a Line of Entrenchment, blocks up the Road from Cabsterre; which at at this place; is steep, Rough, and difficult of access. The confined face of this post, and its command over the lowgrounds at the Ravin Sallee; the shelter which the works procure from the high wooded mountains on their left; and the Ragged Precipices on their Right; the Cover they Receive from the Rising grounds that Envelope; and security in Rear, by a long tract of Close, wooded Country; give such Resources to an Enemy for their defence; as may in my opinion, Render an Attack on this Post, from the Ravin Sallee, unsuccessfull, if not impracticable, against troops of moderate Conduct or Resolution.

Its use to the Inhabitants

In 1759. the French Established two Magazines in the Grande Reduit; on a clear piece of Ground, close upon the foot of the Mountains; sufficient to maintain the Inhabitants of Cabiterre, and Trois Rivieres, with Provisions for Six Months; and supply all the Batteries of this district, with Powder. On a sloping Green, a little distant from those Store Buildings, an irregular Hutment was formed, for the families, and effects, of those who retired to this situation, on the first alarum of our Approach; here they remained unmolested, till the Capitulation was Signed; and had plenty of water, live Stock, and all kinds of fresh Provisions, to render such a Retreat easy & comfortable.

Having thus explained the situation and Strength of the Grande Reduit; and its utility, and consequence to the Inhabitants; there can be no manner of Doubt, that a successfull attack upon this Strong hold, (which, in fact what the Inhabitants themselves, look upon as their derniere Resource), will instantly determine the fate of Guadeloupe. I shall therefore proceed to the following measures, which appeared to me upon the Spot, the most eligible, for the Attack. Viz.

Disposition for the Attack. } That the Army employ'd upon the Reduction of Fort Royal, and the Dordáne, should after securing those acquisitions, proceed immediatly towards the front of the Grande Reduit; by the Publick Road from Grande Anse; which in some parts, they will find Close, and Rugged; but very Practicable for the Advancement of Field Artillery; during which interval, the other division of our Army from Port George; are to execute their descent on Cabsterre, and Approach the Enemy's Rear.

The Army in front of the Grande Reduit, to be formd into three Bodies for the Attack. The first division, which should equal both the others in number; for the Right hand attack, towards the Sea; the second, for the left, Close to the foot of the mountains; And the third, to Awe the Center of the Enemy's Line.

Attack. } The Troops on Cabsterre side, should begin the day; by a Brisk Cannonade upon the Enemy's Battery, and Entrenchment; advancing at the same time, part of the light Infantry towards Chambardier's house, by the small Road (m.o.n.) & an other division along (o.p.q.) to seize upon their works in Flank;

should the Enemy have neglected to secure those Inlets. This Manoeuvr will have a good Effect, should it not succeed; as it will impress the Enemy, with the notion of a serious attack on this side; and I am persuaded from the small experience of service I have had; that even good troops may be staggered, by the very intelligence of an Enemy's penetrating their Rear.

The weakest part of the Enemy's front, is opposite to Madam Grants Plantation, and from thence towards the Sea; as the Bank for this Space, is lower, and more accessible, than any other Part; and its fire did not appear to have been proportionably increased by the addition of other works.

The Left hand Division, should therefore at Break of day; endeavour to discompose the Enemy's Right, close to the Mountains; while the Grande Division for the Right attack; after silencing the Batteries of the Enemy's left; Cross the Petit Cerbet, under Cover of our Artillery; (which for this service, ought not to be less than 12 Pounders;) and force the Enemys Entrenchment, near to the Sea. Should the Enemy at this Instant, weaken the Center of their Line;

by drawing off their forces, to sustain the Right and left attacks; our third and Center Division, should form a disposition for embrace:ing the advantage of such a step; but if they only amuse that part of the Line, with their Artillery, I think it more than Probable, that the Enemy will not incline to the Right, or left attacks; in short, I would push that most, which best succeeds.

The Country of the Grande Reduit, Rises gradu:ally from the Battery next the Sea, to the Situation of the Magazine, and Retrenchment; and there is no other impediment, as far as consists with my knowledge, to our troops having full possession of the Grande Reduit; after which acquisition, we may with propriety assure ourselves, with the entire Conquest of Guadeloupe. —

Conclusion

Should I be found during the course of this Siege, to differ materially, from the Manoeuvres practised at the Reduction of Guadeloupe last War, I hope it will not be understood from thence, that the least Reflection towards the Conduct of such Generals as were present to that Service, had possess'd any share of my intentions; or that

the communication of the above Remarks was actuated by any undue presumption; for the Experience I had on three successive Expeditions to the West Indies last War; The Intelligence I procured of the Conquered Caribbé Islands in general, by Reconnoitring before, and after their Attacks; and the Knowledge I acquired of Guadeloupe in particular, during my residence there as Chief Engineer for two years; removed the only doubt which at first struck me with respect to the propriety of an Attempt of this nature, its coming from an Officer, whose Rank, perhaps might not entitle him, to weight, or consequence enough, to direct a siege of such importance to his Country; besides, I was well persuaded that those Surveys, Plans, and Sketches, were not executed by, or in the possession of any other Officer, consequently their Value, even as a rare commodity, might render them acceptable to Government; as well as usefull and interesting to the Service; and should the result of my endeavours be found to answere in this Respect, I shall ever esteem them happily employ'd.

Arch.d Campbell
Capt. Lieut. Engineer




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